Potential Risks

DISCLAIMER // NFA // DYOR

This analysis is based on decompiled bytecode and observations of the contract behavior. We are not smart contract security experts. This document aims to explain what the contract appears to do based on the code, but should not be considered a comprehensive security audit or financial advice. Always verify critical information independently and consult with blockchain security professionals for important decisions.

⊙ generated by robots | curated by humans

METADATA
Contract Address	`0xe88BAab9192a3Cb2C0a50182AB911506e5aDc304` (etherscan)
Network	Ethereum Mainnet
Analysis Date	2025-12-26

Risk Summary

CATEGORY	RISK LEVEL	NOTES
Centralization	△ Medium	Single owner EOA, no multisig
Code Verification	☒ High	Source not verified on Etherscan
Upgrade Risk	☑ Low	Not upgradeable
Rug Pull Risk	△ Medium	Owner controls no special token functions post-initialization
Smart Contract	☑ Low	Standard patterns, no unusual mechanics
Economic	☑ Low	Fixed supply, no hidden minting

Centralization Points

Owner Powers

The contract owner currently has the following capabilities:

POWER	STATUS	RISK
Mint new tokens	☑ Disabled	Cannot mint after initialization
Burn user tokens	☑ Not possible	Users can only burn their own tokens
Pause transfers	☑ Not possible	No pause mechanism exists
Blacklist addresses	☑ Not possible	No blacklist mechanism exists
Change fees	☑ Not possible	No fee mechanism exists
Transfer ownership	△ Active	Can transfer to new owner
Renounce ownership	△ Active	Can permanently renounce

Owner Risk Assessment

graph TD
    subgraph "Current Owner Powers"
        O[Owner<br/>0x9c146431...82A0DC]
        O -->|Can| TO[Transfer Ownership]
        O -->|Can| RO[Renounce Ownership]
        O -.-x|Cannot| M[Mint Tokens]
        O -.-x|Cannot| P[Pause Contract]
        O -.-x|Cannot| B[Blacklist Users]
        O -.-x|Cannot| F[Charge Fees]
    end

    style O fill:#ffe1e1
    style TO fill:#fff4e1
    style RO fill:#fff4e1
    style M fill:#e1ffe1
    style P fill:#e1ffe1
    style B fill:#e1ffe1
    style F fill:#e1ffe1

Analysis: After initialization, the owner has limited powers. The primary concern is ownership transfer to a potentially malicious party, though this would not grant additional token manipulation capabilities.

Governance Structure

ASPECT	STATUS	NOTES
Multisig	☒ No	Owner is an EOA
Timelock	☒ No	No delay on admin actions
DAO	☒ No	No governance mechanism

Trust Assumptions

What You Must Trust

ASSUMPTION	RISK IF VIOLATED	LIKELIHOOD
Owner won't transfer ownership to malicious party	Low impact (limited powers)	Low
Presale wallet will distribute tokens fairly	Users may not receive tokens	Medium
Token has utility/value	Economic loss	Unknown

Trust Model Diagram

flowchart TD
    subgraph "Trust Required"
        T1["Owner acts in good faith"]
        T2["Presale wallet distributes correctly"]
        T3["Project delivers on promises"]
    end

    subgraph "No Trust Required"
        N1["Token transfers work correctly"]
        N2["Burns reduce supply"]
        N3["No additional minting"]
        N4["Contract code is immutable"]
    end

    style T1 fill:#fff4e1
    style T2 fill:#fff4e1
    style T3 fill:#fff4e1
    style N1 fill:#e1ffe1
    style N2 fill:#e1ffe1
    style N3 fill:#e1ffe1
    style N4 fill:#e1ffe1

Economic Risks

Token Distribution Analysis

HOLDER	ALLOCATION	PERCENTAGE	RISK
Presale Wallet	3,492,180,104 SENT	89.29%	Large holder can influence price
Owner/Team	419,061,612 SENT	10.71%	Team selling could impact price

Supply Risks

RISK	STATUS	NOTES
Unlimited minting	☑ Not possible	initializeMinting can only be called once
Admin minting	☑ Not possible	No admin mint function exists
Hidden inflation	☑ Not possible	Fixed supply model
Supply manipulation	☑ Not possible	No supply-altering admin functions

Deflationary Model

☑ Burns permanently reduce totalSupply()
☑ TOTAL_SUPPLY() preserves original supply for reference
☑ Anyone can burn their own tokens
☑ No forced burns by admin

Complexity Risks

Code Patterns

PATTERN	STATUS	RISK
Proxy/Upgrade	☑ None	Not upgradeable
Assembly	☑ Minimal	Standard Solidity only
Complex inheritance	☑ Minimal	Standard OpenZeppelin patterns
External calls	☑ None	No external contract dependencies
Oracles	☑ None	No price feed dependencies

Attack Surface

VECTOR	RISK	NOTES
Reentrancy	☑ Low	Standard transfer patterns
Flash loan	☑ Low	No flash-loan-sensitive logic
Front-running	☑ Low	No MEV-extractable operations
Oracle manipulation	☑ N/A	No oracles used

External Dependencies

DEPENDENCY	ADDRESS	RISK
External contracts	None	☑ No external dependencies
Oracles	None	☑ No oracle risk
Libraries	OpenZeppelin patterns	☑ Standard, audited patterns

Verification Status

Source Code

STATUS	NOTES
Etherscan Verification	☒ Not verified
Bytecode Analysis	☑ Completed
Audit	☒ Unknown

Bytecode Analysis Limitations

This analysis is based on decompiled bytecode. While the contract appears to follow standard ERC-20 patterns, bytecode analysis cannot guarantee:

Complete accuracy of reconstructed logic
Absence of subtle vulnerabilities
Exact match with intended behavior

Risk Matrix

RISK CATEGORY	SEVERITY	PROBABILITY	OVERALL
Code vulnerability	Medium	Low	△ Medium
Centralization abuse	Low	Low	☑ Low
Economic manipulation	Medium	Medium	△ Medium
Upgrade/proxy risk	N/A	N/A	☑ N/A
External dependency failure	N/A	N/A	☑ N/A

Recommendations

For Users

Verify source code - Request the team to verify contract source on Etherscan
Monitor presale wallet - Track token distribution from 0xEa35cde1...77eFE
Check ownership status - Monitor for ownership transfers or renouncement
Understand limitations - This analysis is based on bytecode, not verified source

For the Team

Verify contract source - Publish and verify source code on Etherscan
Consider multisig - Transfer ownership to a multisig for added security
Communicate tokenomics - Publish distribution schedule for presale tokens
Get audited - Consider a professional security audit

Questions to Ask

Why hasn't the source code been verified on Etherscan?
What is the distribution schedule for presale tokens?
Is there a plan to transfer ownership to a multisig?
Has the contract been audited?
What is the vesting schedule for team tokens?

Conclusion

The SENT token appears to be a standard ERC-20 implementation with limited admin capabilities. The primary risks are:

Unverified source code - Makes independent verification difficult
Single owner EOA - No multisig protection
Large presale allocation - 89% in one wallet creates concentration risk

However, the contract design limits potential damage:

☑ No admin minting capability
☑ No pause or blacklist functions
☑ No transfer fees or restrictions
☑ Fixed supply model

Professional security review is recommended for users considering significant investment.