Methodology

DISCLAIMER // NFA // DYOR

This analysis is based on observations of the contract behavior. We are not smart contract security experts. This document aims to explain what the contract appears to do based on the code. It should not be considered a comprehensive security audit or financial advice. Always verify critical information independently and consult with blockchain security professionals for important decisions.

⊙ generated by robots | curated by humans

METADATA
Contract Address	`0x93Ad33AC2d4cbA339389F42D9345Db3B34174c9E` (etherscan)
Network	Ethereum Mainnet
Analysis Date	2026-01-13

Overview

This analysis of the Sentinel Hive Registry was conducted through bytecode reverse engineering of an unverified smart contract. The methodology combines automated tooling, manual pattern recognition, and knowledge of common smart contract design patterns to reconstruct the contract's functionality and assess its security properties.

The analysis proceeded in multiple phases: bytecode extraction, opcode disassembly, function selector identification, storage layout mapping, external call analysis, and pattern recognition. Each phase built upon the previous to create a comprehensive understanding of the contract's behavior despite the absence of verified source code.

Thought Process

%%{init: {'theme': 'base'}}%%
mindmap
  root((Sentinel Hive<br/>Registry Analysis))
    Bytecode Analysis
      Opcode Disassembly
        Function Dispatcher
        Jump Table Analysis
        CALLDATA Routing
      Storage Operations
        SLOAD Patterns
        SSTORE Patterns
        Slot Identification
      External Calls
        STATICCALL Detection
        CALL Detection
        Target Addresses
    Pattern Recognition
      Design Patterns
        UUPS Proxy Detection
        Ownable Pattern
        ReentrancyGuard
        Initializer Pattern
      Function Signatures
        4byte.directory Lookup
        Signature Reconstruction
        Parameter Type Inference
      Storage Layout
        Sequential Variables
        Mapping Calculations
        Array Storage
        EIP-1967 Slots
    Security Assessment
      Access Control
        Owner Privileges
        Public Functions
        Modifier Detection
      Risk Identification
        Centralization
        Upgrade Risks
        External Dependencies
        Gas Limitations
      Attack Vectors
        Reentrancy Paths
        Privilege Escalation
        DOS Conditions
    Reconstruction
      Solidity Generation
        Function Signatures
        Struct Definitions
        State Variables
        Modifiers
      Documentation
        Architecture Diagrams
        Flow Charts
        Permission Matrices
        Risk Catalog

Verification Guide

This analysis utilized a combination of blockchain explorers, command-line tools, and manual reverse engineering techniques to understand the unverified contract's behavior.

Tools Used

Foundry (cast): Command-line tool for Ethereum contract interaction and bytecode analysis. Used for reading storage slots, calling view functions, and extracting bytecode.

Python: Custom scripts for bytecode parsing, opcode disassembly, and pattern matching. Used to automate identification of function selectors, storage operations, and control flow.

4byte.directory: Public database of function and event signatures. Used to identify known function selectors and event topic hashes from bytecode.

Etherscan: Blockchain explorer for transaction history, event logs, and deployment information. Used to verify contract behavior against on-chain activity.

EIP Standards Documentation: Reference materials for EIP-1967 (proxy storage slots), ERC-1822 (UUPS), and other relevant standards. Used to identify standard patterns in bytecode.

OpenZeppelin Contracts: Reference implementations of common patterns (Ownable, ReentrancyGuard, UUPS). Used to compare bytecode patterns against known implementations.

External Resources

EIP-1967: Standard Proxy Storage Slots

URL: https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1967

Purpose: Defines standard storage slots for proxy contracts to prevent collisions with implementation storage. Used to identify the implementation address slot (0x360894a1...) and admin slot (0x9016d09d...) in the bytecode.

Knowledge Provided: Storage slot calculations, slot usage patterns, and rationale for specific slot locations. Enabled identification of proxy pattern and upgrade mechanism.

ERC-1822: Universal Upgradeable Proxy Standard

URL: https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1822

Purpose: Defines the UUPS pattern where upgrade logic resides in implementation contract. Used to identify the proxiableUUID() function and upgradeToAndCall() upgrade mechanism.

Knowledge Provided: UUPS implementation patterns, upgrade validation requirements, and security considerations. Enabled classification of upgrade mechanism and associated risks.

OpenZeppelin Proxy Documentation

URL: https://docs.openzeppelin.com/contracts/4.x/api/proxy

Purpose: Reference documentation for proxy patterns and upgradeability. Used to compare bytecode patterns against standard implementations.

Knowledge Provided: Storage layout patterns, delegatecall usage, and initializer patterns. Enabled identification of OpenZeppelin-style implementations in bytecode.

4byte.directory

URL: https://www.4byte.directory/

Purpose: Public database mapping function selectors to signatures. Used to identify function names from 4-byte selectors found in bytecode.

Knowledge Provided: Function signatures for selectors 0x1aa3a008 (register), 0x8da5cb5b (owner), 0xf2fde38b (transferOwnership), and 20+ other functions. Enabled reconstruction of public interface.

Etherscan - Sentinel Hive Registry

URL: https://etherscan.io/address/0x93Ad33AC2d4cbA339389F42D9345Db3B34174c9E

Purpose: View deployment details, transaction history, event logs, and current state. Used to verify analysis conclusions against on-chain behavior.

Knowledge Provided: Deployment timestamp, creator address, transaction count, and event emissions. Enabled validation of inferred contract behavior.

Etherscan - Implementation Contract

URL: https://etherscan.io/address/0xc3431410ff157c3971b9160c1f80da51b787e374

Purpose: View implementation bytecode and verify it's a contract (not EOA). Used to extract bytecode for analysis.

Knowledge Provided: Runtime bytecode, creation bytecode, and deployment details. Source of all bytecode analysis.

Etherscan - SENT Token

URL: https://etherscan.io/address/0xe88BAab9192a3Cb2C0a50182AB911506e5aDc304

Purpose: Verify external dependency behavior and interface. Used to confirm expected balanceOf() function exists.

Knowledge Provided: Token contract interface, decimal places (18), and total supply. Enabled validation of balance check calculations.

Command Line Tools

Tip

Commands below use cast from the Foundry Toolkit. To run the commands below, you must set the RPC URL environment variable:

export ETH_RPC_URL=https://eth.llamarpc.com

Bytecode Extraction

Extract the runtime bytecode from the deployed implementation contract for analysis.

# FETCH RUNTIME BYTECODE FROM IMPLEMENTATION CONTRACT
cast code 0xc3431410ff157c3971b9160c1f80da51b787e374 > implementation_bytecode.txt

# FETCH CREATION BYTECODE FROM DEPLOYMENT TRANSACTION
cast tx 0x<DEPLOYMENT_TX_HASH> input > creation_bytecode.txt

# GET BYTECODE LENGTH TO VERIFY EXTRACTION
cast code 0xc3431410ff157c3971b9160c1f80da51b787e374 | wc -c

Storage Slot Verification

Read storage slots to verify inferred storage layout and current contract state.

# VERIFY EIP-1967 IMPLEMENTATION SLOT
cast storage 0x93Ad33AC2d4cbA339389F42D9345Db3B34174c9E \
  0x360894a13ba1a3210667c828492db98dca3e2076cc3735a920a3ca505d382bbc

# VERIFY EIP-1967 ADMIN/OWNER SLOT
cast storage 0x93Ad33AC2d4cbA339389F42D9345Db3B34174c9E \
  0x9016d09d72d2aeb2b285fb8228a6fb9957a1e32e0356c0b8a96f91c58e71ce87

# READ SENT TOKEN ADDRESS (SLOT 0)
cast storage 0x93Ad33AC2d4cbA339389F42D9345Db3B34174c9E 0x0

# READ MINIMUM BALANCE THRESHOLD (SLOT 10)
cast storage 0x93Ad33AC2d4cbA339389F42D9345Db3B34174c9E 0xa

# READ BALANCE CHECK PERCENTAGE (SLOT 11)
cast storage 0x93Ad33AC2d4cbA339389F42D9345Db3B34174c9E 0xb

# READ COOLDOWN PERIOD (SLOT 13)
cast storage 0x93Ad33AC2d4cbA339389F42D9345Db3B34174c9E 0xd

# READ REGISTRATION OPEN FLAG (SLOT 14)
cast storage 0x93Ad33AC2d4cbA339389F42D9345Db3B34174c9E 0xe

# READ REGISTERED ADDRESSES ARRAY LENGTH (SLOT 3)
cast storage 0x93Ad33AC2d4cbA339389F42D9345Db3B34174c9E 0x3

# READ TOTAL UNIQUE PARTICIPANTS (SLOT 6)
cast storage 0x93Ad33AC2d4cbA339389F42D9345Db3B34174c9E 0x6

# READ TOTAL ACTIVE MEMBERS (SLOT 8)
cast storage 0x93Ad33AC2d4cbA339389F42D9345Db3B34174c9E 0x8

Function Call Verification

Call view functions to verify inferred function signatures and return types.

# VERIFY PROXIABLEUUID() RETURNS CORRECT SLOT
cast call 0xc3431410ff157c3971b9160c1f80da51b787e374 "proxiableUUID()(bytes32)"

# VERIFY OWNER ADDRESS
cast call 0x93Ad33AC2d4cbA339389F42D9345Db3B34174c9E "owner()(address)"

# CHECK REGISTRATION STATUS
cast call 0x93Ad33AC2d4cbA339389F42D9345Db3B34174c9E "registrationOpen()(bool)"

# GET SENT TOKEN ADDRESS
cast call 0x93Ad33AC2d4cbA339389F42D9345Db3B34174c9E "sentToken()(address)"

# GET MINIMUM BALANCE THRESHOLD
cast call 0x93Ad33AC2d4cbA339389F42D9345Db3B34174c9E "minimumBalanceThreshold()(uint256)"

# CHECK IF ADDRESS IS REGISTERED
cast call 0x93Ad33AC2d4cbA339389F42D9345Db3B34174c9E \
  "isRegistered(address)(bool)" \
  0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000

# CHECK IF ADDRESS IS ACTIVE MEMBER
cast call 0x93Ad33AC2d4cbA339389F42D9345Db3B34174c9E \
  "isActiveMember(address)(bool)" \
  0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000

# GET GLOBAL STATISTICS
cast call 0x93Ad33AC2d4cbA339389F42D9345Db3B34174c9E \
  "getGlobalStats()(uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256)"

Event Log Analysis

Query event logs to understand historical contract activity and validate event signatures.

# GET ALL EVENTS FROM DEPLOYMENT TO CURRENT BLOCK
cast logs --from-block 24108083 \
  --address 0x93Ad33AC2d4cbA339389F42D9345Db3B34174c9E

# FILTER FOR OWNERSHIP TRANSFERRED EVENTS
cast logs --from-block 24108083 \
  --address 0x93Ad33AC2d4cbA339389F42D9345Db3B34174c9E \
  --sig "OwnershipTransferred(address,address)"

# FILTER FOR REGISTERED EVENTS (TOPIC HASH 0x7cb2cc0e...)
cast logs --from-block 24108083 \
  --address 0x93Ad33AC2d4cbA339389F42D9345Db3B34174c9E \
  "0x7cb2cc0e..."

# FILTER FOR REGISTRATION STATUS CHANGED EVENTS
cast logs --from-block 24108083 \
  --address 0x93Ad33AC2d4cbA339389F42D9345Db3B34174c9E \
  --sig "RegistrationStatusChanged(bool)"

# COUNT TOTAL EVENTS EMITTED
cast logs --from-block 24108083 \
  --address 0x93Ad33AC2d4cbA339389F42D9345Db3B34174c9E | grep "topics" | wc -l

Transaction Analysis

Analyze transactions to understand function usage patterns and gas costs.

# GET DEPLOYMENT TRANSACTION DETAILS
cast tx <DEPLOYMENT_TX_HASH>

# GET TRANSACTION RECEIPT WITH GAS USED
cast receipt <ANY_TX_HASH>

# DECODE TRANSACTION INPUT DATA
cast 4byte-decode <TRANSACTION_INPUT_DATA>

# SIMULATE A REGISTRATION CALL (DRY RUN)
cast call 0x93Ad33AC2d4cbA339389F42D9345Db3B34174c9E \
  "register()" \
  --from 0x<USER_ADDRESS>

# ESTIMATE GAS FOR REGISTRATION
cast estimate 0x93Ad33AC2d4cbA339389F42D9345Db3B34174c9E \
  "register()" \
  --from 0x<USER_ADDRESS>

Mapping Storage Location Calculation

Calculate storage locations for mapping entries to verify participant data.

# CALCULATE STORAGE LOCATION FOR participants[address] (SLOT 2)
cast index address 0x<USER_ADDRESS> 2

# CALCULATE STORAGE LOCATION FOR isRegistered[address] (SLOT 4)
cast index address 0x<USER_ADDRESS> 4

# READ PARTICIPANT DATA AT CALCULATED LOCATION
PARTICIPANT_SLOT=$(cast index address 0x<USER_ADDRESS> 2)
cast storage 0x93Ad33AC2d4cbA339389F42D9345Db3B34174c9E $PARTICIPANT_SLOT

# CALCULATE BASE LOCATION FOR registeredAddresses ARRAY
cast keccak 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003

External Contract Verification

Verify external contract interfaces and behavior.

# VERIFY SENT TOKEN HAS balanceOf FUNCTION
cast call 0xe88BAab9192a3Cb2C0a50182AB911506e5aDc304 \
  "balanceOf(address)(uint256)" \
  0x<USER_ADDRESS>

# GET SENT TOKEN DECIMALS
cast call 0xe88BAab9192a3Cb2C0a50182AB911506e5aDc304 "decimals()(uint8)"

# GET SENT TOKEN TOTAL SUPPLY
cast call 0xe88BAab9192a3Cb2C0a50182AB911506e5aDc304 "totalSupply()(uint256)"

# VERIFY SENT TOKEN NAME AND SYMBOL
cast call 0xe88BAab9192a3Cb2C0a50182AB911506e5aDc304 "name()(string)"
cast call 0xe88BAab9192a3Cb2C0a50182AB911506e5aDc304 "symbol()(string)"

Analysis Process

Phase 1: Bytecode Extraction and Disassembly

Extract Runtime Bytecode: Retrieved deployed bytecode from Etherscan and via cast code command
Identify Function Dispatcher: Located the function selector dispatcher at the beginning of bytecode
Map Jump Table: Identified all function selectors and their corresponding jump destinations
Disassemble Opcodes: Parsed bytecode into EVM opcodes for detailed analysis

Key Findings:
- 33+ function selectors identified
- Standard Solidity function dispatcher pattern
- UUPS upgrade functions present (0x52d1902d, 0x4f1ef286)
- OpenZeppelin Ownable functions present (0x8da5cb5b, 0xf2fde38b, 0x715018a6)

Phase 2: Function Signature Identification

4byte.directory Lookup: Queried each function selector against public database
Signature Reconstruction: For unknown selectors, inferred signatures from bytecode patterns
Parameter Type Inference: Analyzed CALLDATALOAD operations to determine parameter types
Return Type Validation: Examined RETURN operations to determine return values

Key Findings:
- Most functions matched known OpenZeppelin and standard patterns
- Three functions remain partially unidentified but inferred from behavior
- Registration functions use no parameters (msg.sender implicit)
- View functions return appropriate data types

Phase 3: Storage Layout Mapping

Sequential Slot Analysis: Identified SLOAD/SSTORE operations on sequential slots 0-14
EIP-1967 Slot Detection: Recognized standard proxy slots by their specific values
Mapping Detection: Identified keccak256 operations indicating mapping storage
Array Detection: Found length storage and element base calculations

Key Findings:
- 15 regular storage slots (0-14)
- 3 EIP-1967 standard slots for proxy pattern
- 4 mappings (participants, isRegistered, participantHistory, plus array mappings)
- 1 dynamic array (registeredAddresses)

Phase 4: External Call Analysis

CALL/STATICCALL Detection: Identified all external call operations
Target Address Identification: Traced addresses loaded from storage slots
Function Selector Extraction: Found balanceOf(address) [0x70a08231] and custom eligibility check
Return Value Handling: Analyzed how external call results are validated

Key Findings:
- STATICCALL to SENT token for balanceOf() (read-only, safe)
- STATICCALL to Hive contract for eligibility (read-only, safe)
- No CALL operations that transfer value
- Proper return value validation for external calls

Phase 5: Pattern Recognition

Design Pattern Matching: Compared bytecode patterns to OpenZeppelin implementations
Security Pattern Detection: Identified reentrancy guards, access control, initialization
Upgrade Pattern Classification: Confirmed UUPS pattern via proxiableUUID() presence
Modifier Identification: Recognized onlyOwner and nonReentrant patterns

Key Findings:
- UUPS upgradeable proxy (ERC-1822)
- OpenZeppelin Ownable for access control
- ReentrancyGuard for external call protection
- Initializer pattern for constructor replacement

Phase 6: Risk Assessment

Access Control Review: Mapped all privileged operations and owner authority
Centralization Analysis: Evaluated single points of failure and trust assumptions
Attack Vector Identification: Considered reentrancy, upgrade attacks, DOS, manipulation
External Dependency Risk: Assessed risks from SENT and Hive contract dependencies

Key Findings:
- High centralization risk (single owner controls all admin functions)
- Upgrade risk (no time lock on UUPS upgrades)
- External dependency risk (owner can swap contracts)
- Scalability concerns (unbounded array growth)

Phase 7: Documentation Generation

Architecture Diagrams: Created mermaid diagrams showing system structure
Function Documentation: Documented each function with tabs for different aspects
Storage Layout Visualization: Diagrammed storage slots and mapping calculations
Risk Catalog: Organized risks by severity with mitigation recommendations

Limitations and Uncertainties

This analysis was performed on unverified bytecode, which introduces several limitations:

Function Names: While most function selectors matched known signatures in 4byte.directory, some function names are inferred from behavior rather than confirmed. The actual source code may use different names.

Variable Names: All variable names are approximations based on usage patterns and storage slot analysis. The original source code likely uses different names.

Internal Logic: Complex conditional logic, loop structures, and calculation formulas are approximated from opcode patterns. Compiler optimization may obscure original code structure.

Comments and Intent: Bytecode contains no comments or documentation strings. The purpose and intended behavior of functions is inferred from observable effects.

Struct Definitions: Struct layouts are reconstructed from storage patterns. The original structs may be organized differently while maintaining storage compatibility.

Event Parameters: Event signatures are identified from topic hashes, but parameter names are inferred. Indexed parameters are identified, but non-indexed parameter details may be incomplete.

Error Messages: Custom error selectors are detected, but full error definitions require source code verification.

Constants: Hardcoded values found in bytecode may be named constants in source code. The significance of specific values is inferred from context.

Upgrade History: This analysis examines the current implementation. Previous implementations may have had different behavior. The upgrade history is not fully documented.

External Contract Behavior: Analysis assumes external contracts (SENT, Hive) behave as standard interfaces suggest. Actual behavior may differ, especially if those contracts are also upgradeable.

Validation Approach

To validate findings from bytecode analysis, multiple verification techniques were employed:

Storage Slot Reading: Direct reads of storage slots confirmed inferred variable locations and current values.

Function Calls: Calling view functions validated function signatures and return types.

Event Log Review: Historical event emissions confirmed event signatures and parameter types.

Pattern Comparison: Bytecode patterns were compared against verified OpenZeppelin contracts with identical functionality.

Behavior Testing: Simulated transactions (using cast call) confirmed preconditions and failure cases.

Cross-Reference: Multiple information sources (Etherscan, storage reads, function calls) were cross-referenced to confirm conclusions.

Where multiple verification methods agreed, confidence in the analysis is high. Where verification was limited to single-source inference, uncertainty is noted in documentation.

Recommendations for Users

Given the limitations of bytecode analysis:

Request Source Verification: Contact the contract owner and request they verify source code on Etherscan for full transparency.
Independent Verification: Use the provided cast commands to independently verify storage values and function behavior.
Monitor Contract Activity: Watch event logs and transaction history for unexpected behavior.
Assess Risk Tolerance: Understand that interacting with unverified contracts requires higher risk tolerance.
Start Small: If testing functionality, use minimal amounts until contract behavior is well understood.
Consult Professionals: For high-value interactions, consult with blockchain security professionals who can provide deeper analysis.
Community Review: Share this analysis with the Sentinel community and gather multiple perspectives on risk assessment.

This methodology represents best-effort analysis of unverified bytecode. The conclusions should be considered educational and preliminary pending source code verification and professional security audit.